The Baghdad Pact was one of the alliances formed during the Cold War. It was established in 1955 with the aim of confronting Soviet penetration (the communist tide) in the Middle East. The United States was the originator of the idea, promising military support and economic assistance to member states, but it did not join the pact directly; instead, it delegated Britain to play that role.
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria mobilized all their capabilities to resist the pact and prevent Iraq from joining it. King Saud bin Abdulaziz, the Saudi monarch at the time, exerted every effort to keep Iraq away from the alliance. He made persistent attempts to persuade the Iraqi government not to “get entangled” in a pact that, in his view, would “divide the Arab world and weaken Arab unity.”
However, all of King Saud’s efforts failed, as the Iraqi government did not respond to his appeals.
The Iraqi government believed that forming a bloc with neighboring states and signing a treaty with them was necessary to deter a potential communist threat, and to preserve the country’s independence and its natural and oil resources.
Origins of the Pact
The idea of the Baghdad Pact dates back to the spring of 1953, when U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, accompanied by Harold Stassen, made an exploratory trip to the Near East. In Ankara, he held talks with Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, during which the idea occurred to him of establishing an eastern front as a “shield” to protect the northeastern region from a possible Soviet attack.
To strengthen this “shield,” it was necessary to gather as many states bordering Turkey as possible, forming a link between NATO and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).
In January 1954, Turkish President Celal Bayar was invited to Washington to discuss the situation with President Eisenhower. During a press conference, Bayar declared that neutrality was no longer an option and that nations must choose “either cooperation with the call of freedom or walking the path of servitude.”
The Soviet press reacted angrily, accusing Turkey of creating a shield to please its American patrons, and warning that such a shield would soon collapse because neighboring states opposed it. Neither Bayar nor Menderes paid attention to Moscow’s threats.
On 19 February 1954, Turkey and Pakistan announced their decision to establish a mutual cooperation treaty. Thus, the nucleus of the Baghdad Pact emerged. The Turkish‑Pakistani pact was signed on 2 April 1954 in Karachi. Although military in nature, it did not explicitly carry that label, being framed under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The United States and Britain welcomed the pact, considering it a victory for the “free world.”
Iraq Joins the Pact — and the Arabs Reject It
Since Iraq geographically lay between Turkey and Pakistan, the next step was naturally to bring Iraq into the alliance. If the Turkish‑Pakistani pact was the product of American diplomacy, its completion was the work of Britain, or more precisely, of Nuri al‑Said, Britain’s close ally.
Nuri al‑Said believed that the interests of the Arabs in general, and Iraq in particular, required maintaining strong relations with the West, especially Britain. He was one of the most enthusiastic advocates of the “Eastern Shield,” seeing it not only as protection against communism but also as a safeguard against interference by Iraq’s neighboring states, and as a means to preserve and develop Iraq’s resources.
He may also have hoped to revive the idea of the Fertile Crescent Union, which he had abandoned in 1949 due to tensions with Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
In late 1954, Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes visited Baghdad with his foreign minister. After talks with Nuri al‑Said and Regent Abd al‑Ilah, a communiqué was issued affirming the need for a joint defense pact between Iraq and Turkey against any internal or external aggression.
As soon as the communiqué was released, Cairo, Riyadh, and Damascus reacted strongly. King Saud launched extensive Arab contacts, warning against any military pact between Baghdad and non‑Arab states. In Alexandria, Egyptian minister Salah Salem declared that Nuri al‑Said “should be hanged.”
In December 1954, Egypt threatened to withdraw from the Arab League, and Iraq and Saudi Arabia exchanged threats of recalling ambassadors. Yet these tensions did not halt the negotiations between Baghdad and Ankara.
On 13 January 1955, a joint statement was issued in Baghdad announcing an agreement aimed at enhancing cooperation to ensure the stability and security of the Middle East, including a pledge to repel any aggression from within or outside the region, based on the right of self‑defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
The statement caused alarm in several Arab capitals. President Gamal Abdel Nasser invited Arab prime ministers to Cairo to discuss the matter.
Lebanon’s Position
On 14 January, a Turkish delegation led by Menderes arrived in Beirut at the invitation of the Lebanese government. As former Lebanese Prime Minister Sami al‑Solh later wrote, Lebanon sought to understand the regional dynamics surrounding it. Given its sensitive strategic position, Lebanon adhered to official neutrality between the Baghdad Pact states and the Arab states opposing it.
Saudi Arabia’s Response
On 18 January, the Saudi government issued a statement supporting Egypt’s position and strongly condemning the Iraqi‑Turkish agreement. The statement expressed regret over Iraq’s decision and affirmed that Saudi Arabia would not support any agreement not discussed within the Arab League.
The statement also noted that King Saud had advised Nuri al‑Said not to “entangle” Iraq in such a step.
The Arab League Conference in Cairo
On 22 January 1955, Arab prime ministers met in Cairo at Nasser’s invitation. They discussed Arab foreign policy, economic cooperation, military assistance, and the Iraqi‑Turkish agreement.
They recommended:
- Coordinating foreign policy according to the Arab League Charter and the Joint Defense Treaty
- Strengthening economic cooperation
- Cooperating with the West only if Arab issues were resolved fairly
- Rejecting any alliances outside these frameworks
Debate over the Iraqi‑Turkish pact revealed deep divisions. Nuri al‑Said refused to attend the meeting, citing health reasons, and sent Iraq’s representative to the Arab League instead.
The conference resolved to send a delegation to Baghdad in a last attempt to persuade Nuri al‑Said to abandon the pact, which they believed “fractured Arab unity.”
The mission failed.
Media attacks escalated between Baghdad on one side and Cairo and Riyadh on the other. Iraq’s distancing from the Arab fold was seen as a dangerous precedent. In this tense atmosphere, King Saud addressed the Arab peoples on 11 February, warning that the Arab nation was being tested in its most precious institution—the Arab League. He declared that Nuri al‑Said had defied the Arab consensus and that the King had failed to dissuade him from “this frightening and perilous step,” which endangered the Arab world.
Radio Baghdad broadcast parliamentary debates defending the pact and criticizing Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The media war intensified.
Signing the Pact
Despite Arab anger, Nuri al‑Said did not retreat. On 25 February 1955, the pact was signed in Baghdad for five years, mirroring the Turkish‑Pakistani agreement. Britain immediately expressed satisfaction and joined the pact twenty days later.
The United States expressed some reservations, facing embarrassment with its Saudi ally, but it recognized the pact’s military value. It quickly moved its military base from Tripoli, Libya, to Incirlik in Turkey.
Syria had no intention of joining the pact, as it had long demanded the return of the Alexandretta (Iskenderun) district from Turkey. However, it attempted to ease the anti‑pact campaign to avoid becoming a victim between Baghdad and Ankara.
In Jordan, the idea initially gained support, especially given the £22 million Britain paid annually to the Jordanian treasury. Britain sent a delegation to Amman to persuade King Hussein, but the effort collapsed dramatically: four ministers resigned on the same day the treaty was to be signed, violent clashes erupted in Amman and other cities, and three governments fell within eight days.
Realizing the danger, King Hussein abandoned the idea, and Jordan officially announced it would not join the Baghdad Pact.
King Saud congratulated King Hussein, as did President Nasser. Saudi Arabia and Egypt promised to compensate Jordan with the same amount Britain had been paying—but Jordan never received a single penny from either country.