A Reading in the Book Prince Abdullah bin Abdulrahman, authored by Suleiman bin Mohammed Al‑Hadeethi, published in Lebanon by Jadawel Publishing House and available in Saudi Arabia
A new book has been published in Beirut by Jadawel Publishing House, written by Suleiman bin Mohammed Al‑Hadeethi, about the life of Prince Abdullah bin Abdulrahman Al‑Faisal Al‑Saud — may God have mercy on him — the son of the Imam, the brother of the Founder, and one of the statesmen of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia who participated in the unification of the country and contributed to its building phase through various roles.
I was very pleased to see this book published, as it addresses an important era in the history of our nation. I was also pleased by the swift approval it received from the Ministry of Information and its availability in Riyadh bookstores (Al‑Thuluthiyyah and Al‑Turathiyyah), despite the fact that it contains matters we, as children of King Saud, have refrained from discussing out of concern for family cohesion and in order to preserve the unity of the House of Saud — even though we are fully capable of presenting evidence and documents regarding the reign of King Saud, may God have mercy on him, and the political struggles that took place between King Saud and King Faisal.
I extend my thanks to the researcher, to those who provided him with material and funding, and to the Ministry of Information for this book, which will serve as a key that allows us to publish what could not previously be published — to clarify other truths related to that critical period of Saudi history, a period long shrouded in darkness. The time has come for these truths to emerge into the light, so that hearts may find peace, reconciliation may prevail, and rights may return to their rightful owners.
The era of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Abdullah — may God prolong his life and grant him health — has provided this opportunity. It began when Crown Prince Salman, through his presidency of the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives, initiated the movement of stagnant waters and launched a series of symposia on the history of the Kingdom, its kings, and their achievements — including the 2006 symposium on the history of King Saud in Riyadh. That symposium brought about a profound shift in revealing the achievements of King Saud, which had been attributed to King Faisal during and after his reign by writers and media outlets mobilized to rewrite Saudi history after King Saud, in accordance with high‑level decisions — not based on documents that had been concealed to shape the narrative of that important period.
However, the symposium — and those that followed — did not address the period of conflict that ended with the removal of King Saud in favor of King Faisal. This omission left the matter suspended in people’s throats, with fingers of accusation and doubt pointed at King Saud. The unspoken question was: “If King Saud achieved all these great accomplishments, then why was he removed from the throne by his brother?” This question has long caused us pain and a sense of injustice, as we were unable to respond to these accusations that remain embedded in the minds and consciousness of the Saudi people — despite the existence of another truth that must be known so that people may judge for themselves.
Now, with the appearance of this book in Saudi bookstores, there is a clear and explicit declaration that this psychological barrier has been crossed — allowing for free discussion, the expression of differing opinions, and the embrace of the state’s policy under King Abdullah, may God preserve him. This policy is reflected in the publication and distribution of this new work, which presents a familiar and widely accepted perspective. Now, God willing, the other perspective — which I have prepared over a long period and is ready for publication abroad — will also emerge. I hope that I will receive the same treatment from the Ministry of Information and the relevant authorities, so that my work may also be distributed in Saudi bookstores during this era of intellectual openness. My thanks go to all.
I read the book carefully, paying close attention to its documents and references. I focused on the period of King Saud — may God have mercy on him — because it is my area of interest, and because I consider myself a researcher of this important era that has been absent from Saudi historiography for fifty years.
First:
The book consists of 272 pages (excluding appendices). Of these, 29 pages are devoted to Prince Abdullah’s relationship with King Saud, and only 6 pages to his relationship with King Faisal — despite the author stating that Prince Abdullah was aligned with King Faisal (p. 242) and that he held a negative view of King Saud even before King Abdulaziz appointed Saud as Crown Prince (p. 233), based on the testimony of Prince Abdullah’s sons, Princes Saud and Ahmed. The author does not explain why Prince Abdullah held this position toward King Abdulaziz’s choice of Saud as Crown Prince. Was it due to his preference for King Faisal? Or was it because he favored Prince Mohammed bin Abdulrahman and his son Prince Khalid as candidates for the succession? (All relevant documents will be published in the forthcoming book on King Saud.)
Did these early inclinations influence his complete alignment with King Faisal during the crisis? (p. 246) This leads us to infer that his motives may have been emotional — as when DeGoury described Prince Abdullah as “Faisal’s lifelong friend” (p. 260), and when Prince Abdullah himself said: “I was always with Faisal, heart and soul” (p. 260). If his positions were not based on right and wrong, this unfortunately contributed to the formation of factions within the family — contrary to the wishes and instructions of King Abdulaziz, who envisioned his brothers as arbiters in disputes, not parties to them. King Saud, for his part, loved and respected his uncles, consulted them, and appointed them to positions of responsibility.
Second:
The author relies on Munir Al‑Ajlani’s 1977 book on Prince Abdullah. Al‑Ajlani belongs to a group of writers who authored works on Saudi history during the period after King Saud’s reign and even after the King Saud symposium. These works contain historical inaccuracies drawn from sources that contributed to distorting King Saud’s legacy — despite the fact that King Saud granted Al‑Ajlani political asylum in 1962, appointed him as an advisor, and that he served as a senior advisor in the Ministry of Education under Minister Hassan Al‑Sheikh.
The author also cites Alexei Vasiliev (p. 239), who, when commissioned to write a history of the Kingdom, did not meet any witness to King Saud’s era who represented an alternative viewpoint to the dominant narrative of 1995 and earlier. Vasiliev wrote that “King Saud adopted domestic and foreign policies that did not align with the views of many princes, especially Crown Prince Faisal… who were described as conservatives,” foremost among them Prince Abdullah. This is accurate, for according to the documents, King Saud favored a more open domestic policy and a stronger commitment to Arab‑Islamic causes, and he opposed Western, American, and Israeli positions that he considered humiliating to Arab interests. These honorable stances led to Western hostility toward him — including his 1956 oil embargo on France and Britain, the severing of relations with them for four months, his support for Egypt, and his declaration of general mobilization in the Kingdom, which caused an economic crisis due to the lack of foreign currency.
These factors contributed to the financial crisis, compounded by ARAMCO’s reduction of oil production to pressure King Saud — as documented in American and British archives. This was accompanied by the Anglo‑American “Omega Plan,” devised by John Foster Dulles and Anthony Eden, aimed at combating communism, toppling Nasser, breaking the Saudi‑Egyptian alliance, changing the government in Syria, and warning King Saud that he could be replaced — all documented in British and American sources.
King Saud’s declared policy was to reject Western alliances such as the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine, and to avoid taking sides in the Cold War. This removed him from Western calculations and made him a rival to Nasser as a potential Arab and Muslim leader — as noted in Eisenhower’s memoirs.
The author continues recounting the events of King Saud’s removal as they appear in official records or in the works of previously mentioned authors, without analyzing the events — such as Salah Al‑Munajjid’s statement: “Prince Abdullah played a prominent role in supporting Faisal’s rise to the throne” (p. 246), which is used to show that Prince Abdullah sided with the victorious party, presumed to be the side of truth.
The author also cites (p. 242) Prince Nawwaf’s 1997 interview with Imaduddin Adeeb, in which Prince Nawwaf said that Prince Abdullah supported Prince Faisal’s position. But he omits Adeeb’s question to Prince Nawwaf: Could what happened — the removal of King Saud — have been avoided? Prince Nawwaf replied: Yes.
At this point, I must say: after fifty years of King Saud’s removal, the erasure of his history, and the distortion of his reputation — what have we gained as a family and as a Saudi people except division, pain, the loss of truth, and wounds that have not healed and will continue to bleed until justice is restored to this great king?
We hope that our father, the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, and his Crown Prince Salman — may God prolong their lives — will take the step needed to close this file that continues to wound everyone: by restoring King Saud’s history and rights in the homeland and at all levels, as an earned and rightful due, and by ensuring that his reputation becomes a red line like that of the other kings. The alternative perspective must be given the same openness that was granted to the narrative that distorted King Saud’s legacy, for history will take its course and the truths — now accessible to all — will inevitably emerge.
Fahda bint Saud bin Abdulaziz