Clarifying Certain Facts Regarding British Documents Related to the History of King Saud and Saudi–Arab–British Relations
By: Fahda bint Saud bin Abdulaziz
During the past year, the history of King Saud—may God have mercy on him—was one of the most prominent topics discussed in the local and Arab press. It received considerable attention from the Saudi public through the King Saud Symposium organized by the King Abdulaziz Foundation.
The significance of this symposium lay in unveiling the history of King Saud to the Saudi people, given the absence of documented information about his life and era, and consequently about the history of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia during that critical period.
This major effort, led by His Royal Highness Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz, Chairman of the Foundation’s Board of Directors, under the reign of our father, the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, aimed to document the Kingdom’s history during that important era and highlight the role played by King Saud—an integral part of the Kingdom’s honorable history, marked by decisive political positions during a pivotal period characterized by regional and global conflicts and violent shifts in the balance of power, much like what we witness today on the Arab and international stage.
The symposium was a welcome ray of light, marking the beginning of deeper scholarly research into the realities of that era. The studies presented—many still awaiting publication—should serve as a foundation for further inquiry.
My own paper offered a preliminary guide to the sources necessary for studying the history of King Saud, including British documents, given the lack of access to a national Saudi archive. I had hoped that all those interested in writing about this period would refer to this preliminary guide, especially since anyone seeking to understand King Saud’s history accurately must be well‑versed in the political events of the time through British, American, and Russian documents, in order to grasp the forces shaping the Arab region and the global ambitions competing over it.
In the article by Mr. Eyad Abu Shakra on British documents—titled “Riyadh Was the Fiercest Opponent of the Baghdad Pact…”—we did not find an answer to the question posed in the subtitle. Instead, we found that the author relied on secondary sources and personal interpretations, such as the writings of Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, which were biased and inaccurate. This reliance reflects a lack of access to primary references on King Saud and his positions—an area still in its early stages of factual discovery and analysis.
This was evident in the article’s treatment of highly sensitive issues, relying on interpretations repeated over the past five decades, unsupported by internal or external archival evidence. It suggests that the author is a reader of history rather than a specialist, as shown by the contradictions in his presentation.
1. On the Preparation of King Saud for Leadership
The author begins by stating that during King Saud’s reign, his brother Crown Prince Faisal played a prominent political role “prepared for him by their father.”
If so, who prepared King Saud to be Crown Prince?
We all acknowledge King Abdulaziz’s wisdom in entrusting leadership to those capable of preserving and advancing the nation—building internal stability and forging strong Arab, regional, and international relations. King Saud had demonstrated this capability since his youth: as a warrior, then a military commander under his father, then Deputy Ruler of Najd, then Crown Prince for twenty years, and finally the de facto ruler during the last five years of King Abdulaziz’s life due to the latter’s illness.
During that period, decrees were issued from the Crown Prince’s Office, such as Royal Decree No. 140 (19 October 1952) concerning reforms in the Hijaz—known as the “Crown Prince’s Reforms”—found only in U.S. classified security documents No. 129 (16 November 1952). Another decree, No. 331 (November 1952), expanded the Shura Council and established its regulations.
By the time he assumed the throne after his father’s death, King Saud had spent thirty‑eight years (1915–1953) being prepared by King Abdulaziz for leadership, beginning at age thirteen (having been born in 1902, the year Riyadh was recaptured).
Thus, King Saud was prepared not only to make decisive choices but also to bear their consequences—even when they displeased the West.
One example is the first oil embargo in the Kingdom’s history, imposed on France and Britain after the Tripartite Aggression against Egypt, under Royal Decree No. 1‑11‑16‑993 (3 Rabi‘ al‑Thani 1376 / 1956). The embargo lasted until the withdrawal of the invading forces on 10 Sha‘ban 1376.
He also declared general mobilization and severed diplomatic relations with both countries for two years.
This courageous stance—placing all Saudi economic and logistical capabilities at Egypt’s disposal—has rarely been highlighted, even by our Egyptian brothers. It is therefore essential for Saudi scholars to study it in order to understand global reactions and their impact on King Saud’s policies and, consequently, on Saudi foreign policy.
2. On the Buraimi Oasis Dispute
The author describes the Buraimi Oasis issue as a “small Gulf dispute,” but it was far from small. It was the most significant issue affecting Saudi–British relations, which deteriorated sharply after the dispute erupted in 1954, early in King Saud’s reign.
In reality, tensions began earlier—in 1952, before King Abdulaziz’s death—when he observed increasing British colonial activity in the Gulf, particularly British ambitions toward the Buraimi Oasis.
The dispute remained unresolved during King Saud’s reign because he rejected Britain’s biased policy favoring the Emirates and Oman against Saudi Arabia’s national interests.
British documents from the National Archives (Foreign Office), dated 16 April 1955, confirm Britain’s absolute refusal to consider any diplomatic settlement with Saudi Arabia regarding Buraimi. Even the United Nations’ involvement in 1960 failed to produce any agreement due to Britain’s intransigence and King Saud’s firm commitment to defending Saudi sovereignty and territorial integrity.
3. On the Alleged Differences Between King Saud and Crown Prince Faisal
The article contains a striking contradiction: it first claims there was no political disagreement between King Saud and Crown Prince Faisal, then asserts that their personalities, temperaments, and interests differed.
However, British documents—well known to the author—indicate no political disputes between them during the early years of King Saud’s reign.
In fact, both King Saud and King Faisal were close to their father, King Abdulaziz, as they were his eldest surviving sons after the death of Prince Turki. He prepared both for political leadership from a young age: Saud as future king, and Faisal as Crown Prince.
This succession pattern remains the foundation of Saudi governance to this day.
Naturally, individuals differ in temperament—even siblings—but the essential point is that King Saud and Crown Prince Faisal shared a unified commitment to preserving the Kingdom’s unity and defending its supreme national interests against external ambitions and conspiracies.
This was especially critical at a time when the Kingdom was vulnerable to foreign designs and was still in the early stages of building and equipping its armed forces—an effort initiated by King Abdulaziz