The period extending from late 1954 to early 1955 was a critical phase during which intensive negotiations were conducted to establish the Baghdad Pact between Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran, backed by Britain and the United States.
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria mobilized all their capabilities to resist this pact and to prevent Iraq from joining it. King Saud exerted every effort to persuade Iraq not to become entangled in a pact that would divide the Arab world and weaken Arab unity—but to no avail. His attempts were not welcomed by the Iraqi government, partly due to the growing Saudi‑Egyptian rapprochement. Iraq justified signing the pact by claiming the need to align with neighboring states to deter a potential communist threat and to safeguard its independence and natural and oil resources.
The origins of the Baghdad Pact go back to the spring of 1953, when John Foster Dulles, accompanied by Harold Stassen, undertook an exploratory tour of the Near East. They held talks in Ankara with Adnan Menderes, and afterward conceived the idea of creating an eastern front, a “shield” to protect the northeastern region from a possible Soviet attack. Strengthening this “shield” required bringing together as many states bordering Turkey as possible, forming a link between NATO and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).
In January 1954, Celal Bayar was invited to Washington, where he discussed the matter with President Eisenhower. At the end of the talks, Bayar declared in a press conference that neutrality was no longer an option and that nations must choose either to cooperate with the “cause of freedom” or walk the path of servitude.
This statement ignited the first spark. Soviet newspapers erupted in anger, reminding Bayar of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s admiration for Lenin. They wrote:
“The President of Turkey imagines he can create a shield against the Soviets to please his American patrons, forgetting that such a shield will soon collapse in his hands, for the neighboring states do not approve of it.”
Bayar and Menderes paid no attention to Moscow’s warnings.
On 19 February 1954, Turkey and Pakistan announced their decision to establish a mutual cooperation treaty. Thus, the nucleus of the Baghdad Pact came into being. The Turkish‑Pakistani Pact was signed on 2 April 1954 in Karachi. Although military in nature, it avoided using military terminology by operating under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Britain and the United States welcomed it as a victory for the “free world.”
Since Iraq geographically lay between Turkey and Pakistan, the next diplomatic step was to bring Iraq into the pact. If the Turkish‑Pakistani pact was the product of American diplomacy, its completion was the work of Britain—more precisely, of Nuri al‑Said, Britain’s man in Iraq. Diplomats described him as the man who never allowed the link between London and Baghdad to be severed, even in the most difficult moments of World War II. Nuri al‑Said believed that Arab interests lay in maintaining relations with the West—especially Britain—and he ultimately paid the price for this belief.
There is no doubt that Nuri al‑Said was one of the strongest advocates of the “Eastern Shield.” He saw it not only as a defense against communism but also as protection against a potential Turkish attack on Iraq. He may also have hoped to revive the idea of the Fertile Crescent, a concept he had abandoned in 1949 due to tensions with Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula.
At the end of 1954, Menderes visited Baghdad accompanied by Foreign Minister Köprülü. They held talks with Nuri al‑Said and the Regent Abd al‑Ilah. A communiqué issued after the visit affirmed the need for a joint defense pact between Iraq and Turkey against any internal or external aggression.
As soon as the communiqué was issued, Beirut, Damascus, Cairo, and Riyadh erupted in anger. King Saud launched extensive Arab consultations and warned against any military pact between Baghdad and non‑Arab states. In Alexandria, Salah Salem declared that Nuri al‑Said “should be hanged.”
In December 1954, Egypt threatened to withdraw from the Arab League, and Iraq and Saudi Arabia exchanged threats of recalling their ambassadors. Yet these tensions did not halt the negotiations between Baghdad and Ankara. On 13 January 1955, a statement was issued in Baghdad, signed by the governments of Turkey and Iraq after several days of talks. It aimed to conclude an agreement to strengthen cooperation and ensure the stability and security of the Middle East, pledging mutual assistance against any aggression from within or outside the region, based on the right of self‑defense and Article 51 of the UN Charter.
This statement had a negative impact in Cairo, Riyadh, and Damascus. President Gamal Abdel Nasser soon invited Arab heads of government to meet in Cairo on 22 January to discuss the situation resulting from the statement.
On 14 January, a Turkish delegation headed by Adnan Menderes and Köprülü arrived in Beirut at the invitation of the Lebanese government. As President Sami al‑Solh later wrote in his memoirs, Lebanon’s aim was to understand all the regional currents surrounding it and to follow the details of the discussions concerning this sensitive region to which Lebanon belonged and in which it occupied a strategic position. Lebanon’s reality required it not to join any alliance outside the Arab League, and it maintained official neutrality between supporters and opponents of the Baghdad Pact.
On 18 January, the day the Turkish delegation left Lebanon, the Saudi government issued a statement supporting Egypt’s position, condemning the Turkish‑Iraqi agreement, and expressing regret over Iraq’s decision. The statement declared that Saudi Arabia did not support or approve any agreement not discussed within the Arab League, and that King Saud had advised Nuri al‑Said not to entangle Iraq in such a step.
On 22 January, the Arab heads of government met in Cairo and discussed the following agenda:
• The general international situation
• The main lines of Arab policy, economic cooperation, and economic and military assistance
• The proposed Turkish‑Iraqi agreement
The heads of government adopted recommendations calling for Arab foreign policy to be anchored in the Charter of the Arab League, the Joint Defense Treaty, economic cooperation, and the United Nations Charter, and that no other alliances should be approved. They also endorsed cooperation with the West on the condition that Arab issues be resolved fairly, and that Arab states be provided with the necessary strength to safeguard their security and integrity against any aggression—without compromising their sovereignty.
However, discussions regarding the proposed Iraqi‑Turkish agreement unfortunately revealed deep differences of opinion.
The meeting concluded with a decision to send a delegation to Baghdad in a last‑ditch attempt to persuade Nuri al‑Said and other Iraqi leaders to abandon this alliance, which had fractured Arab unity. The talks in Baghdad produced no results; the hostile campaigns between Cairo, Baghdad, and Riyadh, and even the throwing of bombs at the delegation, had poisoned the atmosphere. Iraq’s departure from the Arab fold was not only a dangerous precedent but also a warning of an impending explosion.
Amid this turbulent climate, the government of King Saud announced the following principles guiding its Arab policy:
• Arab unity is rooted in the natural, mutual sentiment shared among Arab peoples.
• No external circumstances can endanger Arab unity so long as the threat does not come from within.
• Arab collective security rests on two essential pillars: sincerity and cooperation.
• A modest degree of Arab collective security is sufficient to confront Israel; if a greater danger arises, no single Arab state should act alone in determining how to confront it.
• Fundamental principles must be discussed first, as proposed by the Egyptian government.
• Saudi Arabia will not differ with Egypt, nor will the two governments differ with their sister states, so long as all work toward the single goal of unifying the Arab voice.
• The issue recently raised regarding Iraq’s position is a matter that belongs to the collective judgment of Arab leaders, not to each separately.
Faced with the looming danger, King Saud issued an appeal to the Arab peoples on 11 February, beginning with the Arab proverb:
“The scout does not lie to his people.”
He warned that the entire Arab nation was being tested in its most precious institution—the Arab League. He told the Arab peoples that one of their leaders had broken with the consensus of the Arab nation and the will of its peoples, and that he (the King) had failed to convince him of the folly and danger of his policy and of the terrifying step he had taken, thereby assuming before history the responsibility of exposing the Arab world to peril.
He addressed the Arabs, saying:
“O Arabs, will you accept to be slaves after having been free? Will you accept that your lands become a battlefield for a fierce war? Will you accept to join the Zionists in a common alliance and shared arms, and be forced to sign a shameful peace with the Jews?
Your enemies failed to compel you to accept this disgraceful peace, so they have unleashed some of your own against you to force it upon you.”
He concluded his appeal by calling on every honorable Arab to speak out and declare his conviction, for silence in the face of treachery is a crime, and acceptance of it is complicity in its sin.
The appeal of the King of the Peninsula and Imam of the Muslims had a profound and far‑reaching impact on Arab hearts. The Arab monarch had entered the arena and began addressing the masses through radio broadcasts.
Radio Baghdad responded to the King, and having nothing substantive to say, it broadcast parliamentary debates containing false accusations made by MP Mahmoud Baban against Saudi Arabia.
The radio and press war raged between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, as it did between Egypt and Iraq. Sadly, the battle had begun among Arabs themselves. King Saud issued his appeal out of a desire to preserve Arab unity and to warn the Iraqis—both leadership and people—of the consequences of the reckless actions of a single influential man who was bringing disaster upon himself and his nation.
Despite Arab anger, Nuri al‑Said did not relent. On 25 February 1955, the pact was signed for five years, mirroring the terms of the Turkish‑Pakistani pact. Britain immediately expressed satisfaction with what had occurred in Baghdad and affirmed its desire to join the pact, which it did twenty days later.
Washington, however, expressed reservations and found itself in a difficult position due to Saudi Arabia’s anger. King Saud informed Washington that the Arabs were dissatisfied with such a pact, which would have dangerous repercussions on Arab, regional, and international politics.
Cairo accused Nuri al‑Said of betraying his fellow Arabs who had once fought alongside him against Ottoman rule, only for him now to drag them back into its orbit against their will.
The Americans viewed joining the pact as beneficial only in the military sphere—they were pursuing military gains. On 20 March, they moved their air base from Tripoli (Libya) to Adana in Turkey.
Menderes attempted to persuade Cairo to join a purely Islamic alliance, to which Egyptian officials replied sarcastically:
“We did not know that Britain and America had embraced the Islamic faith.”
As for Syria, there was no room for discussion. It had long demanded the return of the Alexandretta (Iskenderun) district from Turkey, but it attempted to mediate with Cairo to reduce the intensity of the campaign against the pact, fearing it might become a victim of Baghdad and Ankara.
The idea initially found acceptance in Jordan in exchange for the 22 million pounds sterling Britain paid annually to its treasury. Britain sent Sir Gerald Templer to Amman to persuade King Hussein. His efforts failed dramatically: four ministers resigned on the day the pact was to be signed, violent incidents erupted in Amman and Nablus, three governments fell within eight days, and King Hussein realized the gravity of the situation. He abandoned the idea of the pact and dismissed Glubb Pasha. Jordan then officially announced its refusal to join the Baghdad Pact.
King Saud immediately congratulated King Hussein and worked with Cairo to persuade it to help Jordan by replacing British financial support with contributions from Egypt and Saudi Arabia equal to the amount Britain had been paying.
This noble initiative by King Saud had a profound impact on King Hussein, the Jordanian people, and Arabs and Muslims in general. President Nasser approved the idea, but later political circumstances prevented its implementation, even though Saudi Arabia paid its share.
King Saud’s Speech Rejecting the Baghdad Pact
Friday, 11 February – 18 Jumada II – 1954
King Saud addressed the Arab peoples, beginning with the proverb:
“The scout does not lie to his people.”
He warned that the entire Arab nation was being tested in its most precious institution—the Arab League. He said that one Arab leader had broken with the consensus of the Arab nation and the will of its peoples, and that he (the King) had failed to convince him of the folly and danger of his policy and the terrifying step he had taken, thereby exposing the Arab world to danger.
He addressed the Arabs, saying:
**“O Arabs, will you accept to be slaves after having been free?
Will you accept that your lands become a battlefield for a fierce war?
Will you accept to join the Zionists in a common alliance and shared arms, and be forced to sign a shameful peace with the Jews?
Your enemies failed to compel you to accept this disgraceful peace, so they have unleashed some of your own against you to force it upon you.”**
He concluded by urging every honorable Arab to speak out and declare his conviction, for silence in the face of treachery is a crime, and acceptance of it is complicity in its sin.