One year after the dissolution of the Egyptian–Syrian union, on 26 September 1962, Colonel Abdullah al‑Sallal, commander of the guard of Imam al‑Badr, led a coup in Yemen.
The Saudi government could not ignore the coup, remain silent about it, nor recognize the new regime he established, for numerous and significant reasons that may be summarized as follows:
• The existence of shared borders between Saudi Arabia and Yemen—near Najran in the east and the Asir–Tihama region in the south. Such dual proximity naturally exerts a major influence on the stability of neighboring states.
• Imam Muhammad al‑Badr’s flight to Saudi Arabia and his request for assistance and support from its government.
• A series of treaties and agreements between the Saudi and Yemeni governments obligating each to assist the other.
• The danger of Egypt establishing itself in Yemen and gaining control over it, which would constitute a continuous threat to Saudi security.
• Egypt’s adoption and promotion of socialist–communist principles, and its efforts to spread them in the Arab world—principles incompatible with Islam and posing a threat to the Islamic faith within the Arabian Peninsula.
These factors produced two opposing positions:
Egypt sent its armies to Yemen to protect al‑Sallal and supply him with weapons and funds.
Saudi Arabia, however, refrained from sending troops in order to avoid any clashes between its forces and Egyptian forces along the border. Nevertheless, Egyptian forces inflicted considerable harm on Saudi nationals without any apparent justification.
Before us are five documents reproduced from Al‑Ahram newspaper, published on 28 and 29 September 1962, and on 5 and 11 October 1962:
On the morning of 28 September 1962, Al‑Ahram published a telegram sent by al‑Sallal to President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Its text read:
“To be delivered immediately to the Leader of Arabism, His Excellency President Gamal Abdel Nasser.
We inform you that the army has declared the revolution and overthrown the rule of the Hamid al‑Din family.
Leader of the Revolution.”
In the same issue, Al‑Ahram published a communiqué issued by Abdel Qader Hatem, spokesman for the Cairo government:
“The United Arab Republic is following with great interest the reports concerning the Yemeni army’s revolution. It opposes any foreign intervention in Yemen’s internal affairs and is monitoring the situation with utmost attention.”
Al‑Sallal did not send a telegram to any Arab government other than Cairo, and no other Arab government issued a communiqué similar to that of Cairo.
The third document is the telegram recognizing al‑Sallal’s new government. Egypt alone issued such recognition, preceding all other Arab governments. The telegram sent by Abdel Nasser to al‑Sallal was published in Al‑Ahram on 29 September 1962. It stated:
“The people of the United Arab Republic are following with great interest the major developments in Yemen and the attempt of the Yemeni people and army to establish a new life that ensures human dignity and honor on Yemeni soil.
The people of the United Arab Republic believe that this era is the era of peoples—who alone shape their destinies with their own hands and realize, through their free will, all their aspirations.
God Almighty created mankind free, equal in opportunity, and equal in justice. He does not approve that barriers of exploitation or the tyranny of reactionaries stand in the way of His will. We have no doubt that the people of Yemen are capable of contributing to the great Arab struggles for a free and dignified life and for a secure and honorable Arab future. If the forces of reaction and colonialism oppose Yemen’s liberation, we believe that God wills freedom to prevail, for it is His sacred word.
I am pleased to inform you that the Government of the United Arab Republic has decided to recognize the Yemen Arab Republic and its government. We stand with the people of Yemen without hesitation in fulfilling their will and supporting their legitimate right to life.”
The fourth document is a telegram from al‑Sallal requesting military assistance, published in Al‑Ahram on 5 October along with the reply. It reads:
On 3 October 1962, al‑Sallal telegraphed the Cairo government requesting the implementation of the Jeddah Pact. The telegram stated:
“I am pleased to inform Your Excellency of the decision of the Yemeni government to adhere to the Jeddah Security Pact between the Yemen Arab Republic and the United Arab Republic, and to request the implementation of the provisions of this pact, which the previous Yemeni government concluded with Your Excellency but did not honor.”
He received an immediate reply in the following telegram:
“I have received with utmost care and attention your telegram in which you affirmed the Yemen Arab Republic’s adherence to the Jeddah Security Pact between Yemen and the United Arab Republic. I assure you that the United Arab Republic faithfully upholds every pact it undertakes, and I confirm to you that the United Arab Republic placed the Jeddah Security Pact into effect from the very hour it received news of the Yemeni Revolution.”
On the 5th of the month, Ali Sabri, the Egyptian Prime Minister, announced that the Council of Ministers had decided to send assistance to Yemen.
The Fifth Document: The Joint Defense Pact
The fifth document is a Joint Defense Pact, signed in Sana’a on 10 October 1962 between Anwar al‑Sadat, envoy of the Cairo government, and Abdullah al‑Sallal.
It was published in Al‑Ahram on the 11th of the month, and reads as follows:
• Both states consider any armed attack on either of them or on their forces to be an attack on both. Accordingly, in accordance with the inherent right of individual or collective self‑defense, each state commits to immediately assist the state under attack and to take all necessary measures, employing all available means, including the use of armed force.
• A Supreme Council and a War Council shall be established.
– The Supreme Council is responsible for setting the highest directives of military policy.
– The War Council is responsible for providing recommendations concerning the defensive plan and the use of armed forces in joint military operations.
• The duration of the agreement is five years, automatically renewable for another five years unless one of the two states notifies the other of its desire not to renew it one year before its expiration.
The agreement entered into force immediately upon signature.
Background: Earlier Saudi–Egyptian Cooperation
In March 1955, Prince Abdullah bin Yahya led a revolt or attempted coup against his brother, Imam Ahmad. Cairo took interest in the matter and dispatched Hussein al‑Shafei, Minister of Social Affairs, to Riyadh to consult with the Saudi government and cooperate in quelling the unrest. The Saudis received him warmly and cooperated with him, and the movement was suppressed. Later, in May 1955, Prince Muhammad al‑Badr traveled to Cairo to thank the head of state for his concern.
This episode was an example of sincere and honorable Arab cooperation.
Saudi Arabia’s Initial Position Toward the 1962 Coup
The Saudi government exercised caution and did not rush to take any measures regarding the turmoil, preferring to wait and observe developments—just as all Arab governments did, except Egypt.
This greatly displeased al‑Sallal, who may have expected Saudi Arabia to follow Cairo’s example by quickly recognizing him and sending forces to protect him. He failed to appreciate that Saudi Arabia’s position regarding Yemen was unique and fundamentally different from Egypt’s. Saudi Arabia was the major Arab state directly bordering Yemen—east, south, and west (via the sea). The British were also present in the south, but the matter did not concern them as deeply as it did the Saudi government, whose policy was decisive for Yemen’s future. Egypt, by contrast, lay nearly a thousand kilometers away, separated from Yemen by the Red Sea.
Al‑Sallal waited five days for a response from Riyadh. When none came, and when he observed calm along the border and quiet within Saudi government circles, he adopted a series of punitive measures, including:
• On 1 October 1962, the fifth day after the coup, he issued a warning to the Riyadh government, cautioning it against cooperating with “reactionaries” and urging it to “remain within its limits.”
• On 2 October, the Yemeni Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs summoned the Saudi Minister Plenipotentiary in Sana’a, informed him of the Yemeni government’s displeasure with Saudi Arabia’s position toward the new regime, and requested that he depart immediately to inform his government that it must not interfere in Yemen’s affairs, and that he should not return until the situation was reassessed.
The Saudi minister was escorted by police officers from the Foreign Ministry building until his departure.
• On 3 October, al‑Sallal’s government issued a decree closing the three Saudi banks in Sana’a, Taiz, and Hodeidah, and confiscating their assets.
• On 2 October 1962, the Saudi government sent a shipment of weapons to Najran aboard one of its aircraft. The three pilots flying the plane diverted it to Cairo, where the weapons were delivered to al‑Sallal. He then used this incident as the basis for a complaint submitted on 4 October to the Security Council, the United Nations, and the Arab League, alleging that the shipment constituted an act of aggression intended to shed Yemeni blood.
• On the evening of the 3rd of the month, Radio Sana’a also broadcast an open address to King Saud, filled with attacks and many objectionable expressions and formulations.
The Saudi government ignored all that had occurred, hoping that its stance—marked by wisdom, moderation, and respect for neighborly relations—would signal to al‑Sallal not to deepen hostility.
Excerpts from Unity Talks (Al‑Ahram, March–April 1963)
We now return to the book Unity Talks, published by Al‑Ahram in March–April 1963. We have already quoted passages from it, and here we cite a Yemen‑related excerpt from column one of page 71 of the minutes of the second meeting held on the evening of 19 March 1963.
General Lu’ayy al‑Atassi, head of the Syrian delegation, asked:
“What is the situation in Yemen now, sir?”
Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer replied:
“Very good—excellent at the moment, thank God. The infiltration operations have begun to withdraw.”
Abdel Nasser added:
“In reality, fifteen days after the revolution everything was calm in Yemen. Then they brought al‑Hasan, and they began sending money and weapons and recruiting people. Up to now they have brought in several thousand weapons, which Saud purchased from Belgium and Pakistan.”
Al‑Atassi asked:
“And has their hope ended now?”
Abdel Nasser replied:
“They have no hope.”
Early Confusion and the Flight of the Imams
Sources in Sana’a and Cairo initially announced—seeking to contain the turmoil—that Imam al‑Badr was among the dead and had been buried under the rubble.
Following the outbreak of the conflict, Prince al‑Hasan, brother of Imam Ahmad and his government’s representative in the United States, arrived in Riyadh. He proclaimed himself Imam, and people rallied around him.
In the second week of the turmoil, Imam Muhammad al‑Badr reached the Saudi border alive.
Al‑Badr’s guards had fiercely resisted the military force that attacked the Qasr al‑Basha’ir (al‑Badr Palace) on the morning of 26 September 1962. The resistance lasted fourteen hours and nearly defeated the attackers, until three tanks arrived from Hodeidah to support the rebels. Al‑Badr changed into the clothes of one of his guards, slipped out of the palace under cover of darkness to a nearby house, and from there escaped across the border.
A large number of tribal sheikhs and notables also fled to Saudi Arabia.
Al‑Badr Requests Saudi Assistance
Imam al‑Badr appealed to the Saudi government for assistance in disciplining the insurgents who had rebelled against him and conspired against his government, and in restoring order to his country. His request was based on the Jeddah Security Pact, previously cited, and on the Treaty of Taif, concluded between the two governments on 7 Safar 1355 AH, which states:
“A state of permanent peace, firm friendship, and enduring Islamic‑Arab brotherhood shall prevail between the two kings, their countries, and their peoples. The two High Contracting Parties pledge to resolve all disputes between them in a spirit of goodwill and friendship, and that their relations shall be governed by the spirit of Islamic‑Arab brotherhood in all circumstances.”
Saudi Arabia’s Policy Decisions
The Saudi government studied the situation in light of the unfolding events and adopted the following decisions:
• Not to participate in the ongoing fighting under any circumstances.
• Not to send a single Saudi soldier to Yemen.
• To provide Imam al‑Badr with limited material assistance to help him regain his throne.
• To maintain a policy of goodwill and brotherhood with Egypt.
The Saudi Diplomatic Protest Over the Seized Aircraft
The Saudi government sought through diplomatic channels to request that Cairo return the aircraft, but received no reply. The Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs therefore sent the following memorandum to the Egyptian Embassy in Jeddah on 4 October 1962:
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United Arab Republic and informs it that aircraft CR‑3B No. 431 of the Royal Saudi Air Force, dispatched on an official mission to transport military equipment to Saudi garrisons on the southern border, and piloted by Captain Rashad Shasha, Captain Ahmed Hussein Taha, and Second‑Class Technician Omar Azmirli, departed Jeddah Airport at 1:30 a.m. GMT on Tuesday, 3 Jumada I 1382 (2 October 1962). When the aircraft failed to arrive at its destination on time, the authorities began investigating the delay. The Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was surprised to learn—during the search—that radio stations of the United Arab Republic had announced the aircraft’s arrival in Cairo, and that the President of the United Arab Republic had dispatched a minister and officials to receive the aircraft and its crew, who had deserted military service.
The Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia strongly protests this action by the Government of the United Arab Republic and demands the immediate return of aircraft C‑132B No. 431 with its full cargo, and the surrender of the crew—Captain Rashad Shasha, Captain Ahmed Hussein Taha, and Technician Omar Azmirli—so that they may be brought before a military court.
The Ministry avails itself of this opportunity to renew its highest regards.
The Egyptian Embassy in Jeddah refused to accept the memorandum and returned it on the 6th. The Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued the following statement on the 7th:
The Embassy of the United Arab Republic has returned the aforementioned memorandum with its own memorandum No. 1887 dated 7‑5‑82 (6‑10‑62), refusing to accept it.
On the evening of Tuesday, 7 November 1962, the Saudi Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs informed the chargé d’affaires of the United Arab Republic in Jeddah that, due to repeated blatant armed attacks by the UAR, the Saudi government had decided to sever diplomatic relations with the United Arab Republic.
UN Mediation and Its Failure
On 4 July 1964, the first year of the international observers’ mandate ended, and a further extension was needed. Although rumors suggested that no renewal would be granted, the UN Secretary‑General announced on 2 July that the mission would be extended for two more months. He then submitted a report to the Security Council calling on Prince Faisal and Gamal Abdel Nasser to meet face‑to‑face as soon as possible to agree on a solution to the Yemen problem and to implement the disengagement agreement. He stated that meaningful progress could only be achieved through such a high‑level meeting.
He added that if no tangible progress was made during the new extension, it would be difficult to justify another renewal.
He estimated that about 3,000 Egyptian soldiers had been withdrawn from Yemen, and confirmed that observers had not detected any Saudi military assistance to the royalists during the reporting period.
Although he acknowledged slight progress in reducing Egyptian forces, he stated that implementation of the disengagement agreement remained far from complete, as Egyptian forces were still present in Yemen. The UN’s role was limited to observation and reporting, and it could not guarantee implementation.
He recommended extending the mission for two more months after 4 July, though with some hesitation, as the mission had been able to observe only a small portion of the Egyptian withdrawal. He urged both parties to meet at the highest level to ensure full and rapid implementation.
When the final extension expired, the situation in Yemen remained unchanged, and Egyptian forces continued to arrive. The UN withdrew from the operation and recalled its observers.
Renewed Royalist Resistance and the Escalation of the Civil War
Imam al‑Badr established a base in the Yemeni mountains near the Saudi border, reconstituted his state and government, and sent calls to the tribes urging them to support him in reclaiming his territory and ending the strife. Large numbers responded, took up arms, and rallied to defend their homeland and punish the rebels.
This marked the beginning of the intensification of the Yemeni civil war.
On 1 November 1962, in the fifth week of the conflict, Egyptian Prime Minister Ali Sabri declared that his government would stand with all its strength beside al‑Sallal’s government against any aggression.
On 2 November 1962, the day after Sabri’s announcement, Egyptian aircraft bombed border areas. A Saudi official communiqué broadcast in Riyadh on the 4th stated:
“Since the rebellion of some Yemenis against the legitimate Mutawakkilite government, the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has followed developments in the brotherly country with great concern. Its anxiety increased with the intervention of the United Arab Republic in Yemen’s internal affairs and its support for the rebellion with weapons, equipment, fighter aircraft, personnel, and experts.”
“It is the duty of the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia—as it is the duty of every government—to take measures necessary to protect its borders adjacent to Yemen from any potential aggression.”
“The Saudi government regrets to record that aggression has occurred against certain Saudi locations by fighter aircraft supplied by the United Arab Republic to the Yemeni rebels who call themselves the Yemen Arab Republic. On Friday morning, 5 Jumada II 1382 (2 November 1962), aircraft belonging to the UAR and operating with the Yemeni rebels carried out five raids on Saudi territory: the village of Jalban, the al‑Tuwal post, the city of Samtah, the al‑Muwassam post, and Wuhaymah. These aircraft dropped bombs on these locations— all within Saudi territory—causing casualties among peaceful civilians, including children, the elderly, and women, as well as damage to property. These acts are nothing but savage aggression committed by the UAR against the people and property of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.”
“The battle waged by the Yemeni rebels against the legitimate Yemeni government is in reality being fought by the UAR with its army, officers, aircraft, and weapons. The Saudi government strongly protests these acts of aggression, holds the UAR responsible for all resulting consequences, and reserves the right to take all necessary measures to repel this blatant aggression and pursue all appropriate efforts in this regard.”
A UAR spokesman responded on the 3rd:
“The Yemen Republic has been subjected for three days to an invasion from Saudi Arabia, as Saudi and Jordanian forces crossed the border to seize the town of Harad near the frontier. The Yemeni Republican forces crushed the Saudi‑Jordanian attack and inflicted heavy losses.”
“The UAR declares that it supports the Yemeni Revolution and will stand with all its strength against any aggression. The UAR holds the (Saud–Faisal) government responsible for all consequences of this invasion on the borders of the Yemen Republic.”
On 7 November 1962, the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation issued the following communiqué:
From 7:30 a.m. Arab time on Monday, 8/6/1382 AH (5 November 1962) until the issuance of this statement (sunset on Tuesday, 9/6/1382 AH, corresponding to 6 November 1962), Egyptian aircraft and three Egyptian naval warships intermittently, by day and night, bombarded the Saudi border villages of al‑Muwassam and Khalaf with bombs and artillery fire, thereby violating Saudi territory and Saudi territorial waters, and inflicting severe losses and damage upon these two villages and their peaceful inhabitants. The extent of these losses is currently being assessed.”
“The Saudi government, in announcing this blatant aggression against its territory and its territorial waters, reserves for itself the absolute right to take whatever measures it deems necessary to defend the sanctity of its land and the safety of its waters, and holds the Egyptian government fully responsible for all consequences arising from the repeated attacks carried out by its forces against Saudi Arabia.”
Saudi Statement of 31 December 1962
“Today (30 December 1962), the city of Najran was subjected to two attacks carried out by Ilyushin‑type bombers belonging to the United Arab Republic forces operating in Yemen.
Among those injured in the first attack was a representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross. In the second attack, several peaceful residents were wounded, including a child and a woman.
It is clear that the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia exercised restraint in the face of the initial air attacks launched by the United Arab Republic against peaceful civilians in Saudi territory, in an effort to avoid the evil and discord that others seek to ignite. However, the incidents have continued, and today’s attack is a clear indication of aggression—an aggression that obliges the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia not to stand idle in the face of its repetition and persistence. The Kingdom therefore holds the United Arab Republic responsible for all consequences arising from its aggression.”
Statement of 1 January 1963
“Yesterday (Monday, 4 Sha‘ban / 31 December 1962), the city of Najran was again subjected to two air raids by bomber aircraft and fighter planes belonging to the United Arab Republic forces operating in Yemen. Our anti‑aircraft defenses fired volleys at the attacking aircraft, forcing them to retreat back into Yemeni territory. Some incendiary and explosive bombs were dropped, injuring several peaceful residents.”
“This act clearly demonstrates the persistence of the Cairo authorities in their aggression. The Saudi government will continue to take all necessary measures to ensure the defense of its people and its territory.”
Saudi Denials of Military Involvement in Yemen
On 13 October 1962 (15 Jumada I 1382 AH), Radio Mecca broadcast an official statement denying that Saudi Arabia had sent any military forces to Yemen.
On the 19th of the same month, the denial was repeated: no Saudi forces were operating in Yemen.
On 19 December 1963, the government issued another statement:
“Statements broadcast on the occasion of the United States’ recognition of the revolutionary government in Yemen contained implications suggesting that Saudi Arabia has armed forces participating in the fighting in Yemen.
The Saudi government has categorically denied this claim on several occasions.
The Saudi government reaffirms once again that it has no armed forces participating in the fighting in Yemen.”
Mobilization Measures Inside Saudi Arabia
On 6 January 1963, the Supreme Defense Council, chaired by Prince Faisal, decided to establish military training centers throughout the Kingdom.
These centers were opened, and turnout was high. Saudi newspapers published articles urging the public to defend the nation.
On the same day (6 January 1963), the Ministry of Defense and Aviation issued the following communiqué:
“In accordance with the decision of the National Defense Council, the Ministry of Defense and Aviation requests the following:
• All members of the armed forces—officers, non‑commissioned officers, and soldiers—must return to their units.
• Directors of Saudi Arabian Airlines and airline offices must transport conscripted officers, NCOs, and soldiers—inside and outside the Kingdom—upon presentation of their official documents, and subsequently submit the necessary reports to the competent authorities for verification. May God grant success.”
The Ministry also issued the following address to the public on the same day:
“Honorable citizens…”
“In implementation of the decision of the Supreme Defense Council to mobilize the manpower of the proud Saudi people, the Ministry of Defense and Aviation announces to honorable citizens that, beginning Saturday, 16 Sha‘ban 1382 AH, it will open five centers to train the sons of the nation in the use of arms to confront any unjust aggression that may be launched against our sacred land. These centers will be located in Riyadh, Dammam, Jeddah, Taif, and Abha, and will operate daily from 9:30 a.m. to 12 noon, except on Thursdays and Fridays.
Every volunteer must be of Saudi nationality, between 18 and 40 years of age, and physically fit for training. Volunteers must register their names at the governorates in the aforementioned cities.
As for citizens residing outside the Kingdom, volunteers among them must register their names at the offices of their respective governorates so that the army may call upon them according to the order of registration and take the necessary measures regarding them.
May God grant success to all in serving our beloved homeland and our noble faith.”
Cairo later attempted to persuade King Saud—when he visited to attend the Arab Kings and Presidents Conference—to reach an understanding with al‑Sallal regarding the Yemen issue. He replied that the matter of Yemen concerned its own sons and its own people, and that Saudi Arabia was not a party to the conflict.
Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation Statement – 5 March 1963
“On Monday, 4 March 1963 (Field Marshal Amer had departed Riyadh for Cairo on Sunday, the 3rd), two Egyptian aircraft raided the city of Abha, dropped bombs upon it, and damaged the general hospital in the heart of the city, injuring several patients.
Losses in lives and property occurred.
Saudi anti‑aircraft defenses engaged the aircraft and forced them to flee.”
On 22 April 1963, President Gamal Abdel Nasser arrived unexpectedly in Sana’a to spend the Eid al‑Adha holiday of 1382 AH among his troops. On the 26th, he traveled to Taiz, near Yemen’s southern border, where he delivered a speech attacking Britain, claiming it had replaced Saudi Arabia in supplying arms to the royalists in Yemen. He also spoke about the Arab summit attended by King Saud, stating that he was prepared to open a new page with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia so as not to give colonialism any opportunity to exploit the situation. He added that Iraq and Algeria had attempted to mediate the dispute between Egypt and Saudi Arabia over Yemen, but the effort had not been completed.
He then declared that Egyptian forces would not withdraw from Yemen so long as the British remained in Aden.
Saudi Complaint to the UN Security Council – 16 June 1963
On 16 June 1963, the Saudi government submitted a complaint to the Security Council, stating that the air raids carried out by Egyptian aircraft on Saudi territory constituted aggression that could be considered an act of war, and that thirty people had been killed in a single raid on the city of Jizan on 6 June.
The complaint also stated that the Saudi government had undertaken no retaliatory action, but might be compelled in the future to take measures in self‑defense, which could lead to a regrettable situation in the Middle East and possibly provoke an international reaction.
Saudi Diplomatic Actions
On 14 February 1962, the Saudi government issued a memorandum requesting the withdrawal of the Egyptian army from Yemen, as its presence posed military and political dangers threatening the entire region.
On 15 April 1963, Saudi Arabia announced its agreement to the formation of a neutral international committee to examine the ongoing conflict in Yemen.
On that same day, a Saudi spokesman issued the following statement:
“The position of the Saudi government regarding the ongoing conflict in Yemen has been—and continues to be—one of wisdom and restraint, in pursuit of a peaceful solution, the prevention of widening divisions, the avoidance of poisoning relations among Arab states, and the safeguarding of precious Arab blood.
From the outset, the policy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has aimed at resolving this conflict on the basis of non‑intervention in Yemen’s internal affairs, leaving the Yemeni people free to determine their own destiny and choose the form of government they deem appropriate.
After a full year had passed since the outbreak of the conflict, the Arab League resolved to undertake mediation. In its session held on 19 September 1963 during its fortieth meeting, the Council decided to dispatch a mission to the Arabian Peninsula to contact its leaders and “work toward restoring peace to Yemen and resuming good relations among the states concerned.”
This delegation consisted of Dr. Nasser al‑Hani, President of the League Council for that year, and Abdul Khalek Hassouna, Secretary‑General of the League. They departed Cairo on 25 September 1963 for Taif to meet Saudi officials. They were warmly received, and discussions between the two sides concluded with the issuance of the following joint statement:
“In implementation of the decision of the Arab League Council in its fortieth session, held on 19 September 1963, which calls upon Arab states to work toward strengthening solidarity, purifying the Arab atmosphere, and enabling the restoration of stability and peace in Yemen and the resumption of normal relations among sister states, Dr. Nasser al‑Hani, President of the current session of the Council, and Mr. Abdul Khalek Hassouna, Secretary‑General, visited the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from 7 to 13 Jumada I 1383 AH (25 September to 1 October 1963). They met with His Royal Highness Crown Prince Faisal, Prime Minister, in the presence of Mr. Omar al‑Saqqaf, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and exchanged views with him on the Arab situation in general and the Yemeni situation in particular.
The Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in harmony with its Arab policy, welcomes every effort aimed at strengthening solidarity, purifying the Arab atmosphere, and restoring normal relations among sister states. It is keen to contribute positively and effectively to achieving these goals, especially in light of the current circumstances surrounding the Palestinian cause, other Arab struggles, shared interests, and the Zionist and colonial conspiracies targeting all Arabs.
The Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has clarified its position on the Yemeni issue to the representatives of the League Council and affirmed its deep concern for what serves the interests of the Yemeni people and assists them in achieving progress and advancement. It hopes that the Council’s representatives will find among the other concerned parties the responsiveness necessary to achieve these aims.”
This mediation produced no significant results, as it remained confined to a narrow and limited framework.
The First Arab Summit (January 1964)
In early January 1964, the Arab League invited Arab governments to participate in the first Arab Summit, scheduled to be held in Cairo on the 13th of that month.
On 5 January 1964, the Kingdom issued the following statement:
“The Saudi government has received from the Secretariat of the Arab League an invitation to participate in the meeting of Arab kings and presidents to discuss measures to be taken regarding Israel’s conspiracy to divert the course of the Jordan River.
The Saudi government, believing in the unity of Arab struggle, consistent with its long‑standing policy and history of supporting Arab causes, and fully aware of the dangers threatening the foremost Arab cause, announces its acceptance of the invitation and its full readiness to assume all responsibilities alongside its sister Arab states.”
King Saud arrived in Cairo at the appointed time, heading the Saudi delegation.
The delegation included:
- Prince Sultan, Minister of Defense and Aviation
- Prince Mansour, Chief of the Royal Court
- Omar al‑Saqqaf, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Major General Abdullah al‑Mutlaq, Chief of Staff of the Saudi Army
Although Gamal Abdel Nasser did not raise the Yemen issue in the summit’s public or private sessions, and avoided discussing it with King Saud, some of his associates brought it up with the King.
Al‑Sallal, attending the summit as President of the Yemen Arab Republic, attempted to approach the King—reportedly even kissing his hand and addressing him as “my father”—seeking a promise of recognition. The King ignored him and did not engage in conversation. Nevertheless, Radio Sana’a broadcast that al‑Sallal had met King Saud and resolved all disputes with him, prompting the Saudi government to issue the following statement on 15 February 1964:
“Some news agencies have circulated a statement attributed to Radio Sana’a quoting al‑Sallal as saying in a speech that he met King Saud in Cairo and resolved all disagreements with him. A responsible source affirms that this report is false. The King did not meet al‑Sallal and did not discuss anything with him whatsoever.”
Egypt Attempts a New Approach
After failing to persuade King Saud to recognize al‑Sallal’s government—and after the Arab League mission, dispatched at Egypt’s request, also failed—Cairo sought another path. It decided to send Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer to Riyadh, accompanied by Anwar al‑Sadat, to meet Prince Faisal and convince him to resolve the Yemen issue on the basis of recognizing al‑Sallal’s rule.
As a precaution, Egypt also arranged for a mediation delegation consisting of:
- Ahmad Tawfiq al‑Madani, representing President Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria
- Dr. Shamil al‑Samara’i, representing President Abdul Salam Arif of Iraq
On 13 February 1964, al‑Madani and al‑Samara’i arrived in Riyadh and were warmly received. They held discussions with Prince Faisal on two matters:
- Saudi‑Egyptian political relations
- The Yemeni problem
Regarding the first, they stated that their governments were prepared to overlook all offenses and all actions committed by Egypt against their countries, and to restore political relations in the interest of Arab unity and in response to the summit’s call—pledging to implement all summit resolutions and expressing readiness to receive an Egyptian delegation to settle outstanding issues.
Regarding Yemen, they said their governments had withdrawn from the matter since the disengagement agreement, and that the issue was now in the hands of the Yemenis themselves.
The March 1964 Negotiations
On Sunday, 1 March 1964, the Egyptian delegation arrived in Riyadh for new talks. It consisted of:
- Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, First Vice President
- Anwar al‑Sadat, Speaker of the National Assembly
They met with the Algerian and Iraqi envoys, who had arrived earlier, and held a two‑hour meeting with the Saudi Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs.
Further meetings were held over the next three days. The three delegations exerted considerable effort to persuade Prince Faisal to modify his position and agree to discuss the Yemen issue. He insisted on adhering to the disengagement agreement, though he expressed readiness to resolve other matters.
The following principles were agreed upon:
• Prince Faisal would travel to Cairo after the Hajj season (around late April) to meet President Gamal Abdel Nasser and continue the discussions begun in Riyadh.
• Both governments would declare that they had no ambitions in Yemen, supported its independence, and opposed any colonial attempt against it.
• Political relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt would be restored, and ambassadors would return to their posts in each other’s capitals.
The Alexandria Summit (September 1964)
Prince Faisal arrived in Alexandria on 5 September 1964, heading the Saudi delegation as Deputy to the King, to participate in the second Arab Summit, which Saudi Arabia chaired.
President Nasser found in Prince Faisal the best intentions and sincere desire to help resolve the issue—provided the solution remained within the framework of the 1963 disengagement agreement and its implementation.
This was recorded in the joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of the summit:
“In the Name of God, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate
The visit of His Royal Highness Prince Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Deputy to His Majesty the King and Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, to Alexandria on the occasion of the convening of the Second Arab Summit, provided an excellent opportunity for an exchange of views with President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic on matters of concern to the Arab nation in general and to the two sister states in particular. Several meetings were held between the two sides, attended by His Royal Highness Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Minister of Defense of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, First Vice President of the United Arab Republic and Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. These meetings resulted in agreement on the following points:
• The determination of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic to cooperate fully in resolving the disputes among the various parties in Yemen, and their commitment to preventing armed clashes.
• The two states shall undertake the necessary contacts and mediation with the concerned parties to create an atmosphere of understanding and reach a peaceful resolution of the disputes, continuing these efforts until the disagreements disappear and stability is restored in Yemen.
• The two sister states affirm their full cooperation in all matters and fields, and declare their mutual support under all circumstances—political, material, and moral.
God is the source of success.”
The Reconciliation Conference (October–November 1964)
On 29 October 1964, a reconciliation conference was held in Arkuwait, a Sudanese town chosen by agreement.
The royalist delegation was headed by Ahmad al‑Shami, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Imam.
The republican delegation was headed by Muhammad Mahmoud al‑Zubayri.
Saudi Arabia sent:
- Ambassador Dr. Rashad Faroun
- Military commander Mahmoud Abdul Hadi
Egypt sent:
- Ahmad Shukri, its envoy to al‑Sallal
- Brigadier Muhammad Mahmoud Qasim
The two Yemeni sides agreed on the following principles:
• A ceasefire
• Yemen for the Yemenis
• A final agreement to be reached at a broader conference in Harad on 23 November 1964, with 169 delegates representing both sides equally
Saudi Arabia approved and endorsed the agreement. This was recorded in an official statement issued on 4 November 1964:
“In response to the contacts undertaken by both the United Arab Republic and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to create an atmosphere of understanding and reach a peaceful resolution of the disputes in Yemen, a joint meeting was held in the form of a preparatory committee in Arkuwait, Sudan, from 23 Jumada II 1384 AH (29 October 1964) to Monday, 27 Jumada II 1384 AH (2 November 1964).”