King Saud loved Egypt from the time he was Crown Prince in his own country until the final day of his life. His friendship with former Egyptian presidents—Mohamed Naguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser, may God have mercy on them both—was a source of admiration well into the late 1950s.
However, Saudi‑Egyptian friendship later suffered a severe setback engineered by the enemies of the Arab and Islamic nations.
From the moment he ascended the throne, King Saud—may God have mercy on him—stood firmly with Egypt and supported its causes. He began by attempting to resolve the internal leadership disputes in Egypt in 1953–1954. His honorable stance did not change during the Suez War, when he ordered a general mobilization in the Kingdom, placed Saudi capabilities at Egypt’s disposal to repel the aggression, halted oil supplies to France and Britain, allowed Egyptian aircraft to land and remain in Saudi airports, and ceded two Saudi islands to Egypt so that it could monitor the movement of hostile ships.
History cannot forget King Saud’s support for Egypt and its leadership against the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine. Unfortunately, foreign malicious hands succeeded during that period in manipulating the file of Saudi‑Egyptian friendship, plunging the Arab world into a dark chapter in the history of relations between the two countries—and indeed among Arab states as a whole. The Arab world was divided into two camps: a “progressive” camp and a “reactionary” one—labels that appear almost comical when judged by today’s standards.
The 1950s and 1960s remain among the least studied and least understood periods in the history of Saudi‑Egyptian relations for several reasons, foremost among them the absence of Arab documentation that clarifies what occurred, and the fact that the history of King Saud was entirely marginalized in the collective Arab narrative—despite his role, of which we as Saudis, and as Arabs, are proud. He was one of the Arab leaders who played a prominent role regionally, Arab‑wide, globally, and within the Islamic world, particularly in matters concerning Egypt.
The so‑called “cheques affair”—alleging that the King had issued payments to conspirators in Syria to undermine the Egyptian‑Syrian union—is nothing more than a fabricated story intended to sow discord between Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and between the two prominent leaders of that era: King Saud and President Gamal Abdel Nasser, may God have mercy on them both.
Can any rational person believe that a solid union between two peoples could be undone by a cheque sent to an obscure individual here or support given to a minor officer there? What kind of fragile union could be destroyed by an anonymous dinner meeting? Logical reasoning dictates that a genuine union, built on strong and deep relations, cannot be shaken even by invading armies—let alone by alleged “green dollars.” Yet only a few writings adopted this analytical approach, and they lacked depth and rigorous study.
Historical literature from that period indicates that the separation between Syria and Egypt occurred far more quickly than many imagined, for objective reasons that President Abdel Nasser himself acknowledged. Among these reasons: the union was established without popular, economic, or political preparation; it emerged from a hasty meeting between two leaderships driven by revolutionary enthusiasm but lacking a clear vision for the steps ahead. President Abdel Nasser admitted in a speech that he had been pressured by the Syrian military leadership during his visit to Syria to approve the union quickly. He later acknowledged that many factions in Syria were fundamentally opposed to the union—communists, Baathists, Syrian nationalists, and others. Numerous books have pointed to the many administrative and political errors committed by the unified leadership headquartered in Damascus under Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer. These errors were later detailed by President Abdel Nasser and attributed to the former Minister of Defense following Amer’s suicide.
King Saud—may God have mercy on him—was certainly not pleased with the Egyptian‑Syrian union, not because it was an Arab‑Islamic unity desired by all, but because it was built on faulty foundations, rushed by its architects, and undertaken without consulting the third partner who had previously stood with both sides. Moreover, King Saud, as the leader of a conservative nation, had legitimate concerns that the union might not serve the Arab nation but instead deepen its divisions and split it into two hostile blocs.
The speed of the separation and the subsequent deterioration of Egyptian‑Syrian relations later confirmed the soundness of King Saud’s perspective—a view shared by many wise Arab leaders. President Abdel Nasser himself stated in speeches after the separation, including during the Khartoum Summit, that if time could be reversed, he would not have entered the union with such haste and emotional fervor. He also acknowledged that the union’s collapse led him into Yemen’s internal affairs and into military events along Saudi Arabia’s southern border during the Yemeni‑Egyptian‑Saudi crisis. Egypt paid a heavy price for this intervention, and many Egyptian military leaders later admitted that the disastrous defeat of 1967 would not have occurred had it not been for the consequences of the Egyptian‑Syrian union, its rapid collapse, and the dispersal of Egyptian military efforts in the mountains and valleys of Yemen.
How beneficial it would have been had Saudi‑Egyptian relations continued along the path charted by the two leaders—Abdel Nasser and King Saud, may God have mercy on them—since the early 1950s. Had that been the case, the Arab world might have been spared the dark days of 1967, Saudi Arabia might have avoided its internal unrest, and Egypt’s economy might not have suffered the turmoil caused by years of strained relations between the two dominant Arab states of that era. We have seen how Saudi‑Egyptian alignment bore fruit during the October War—and as we see again in our own time.
Even after King Saud—may God have mercy on him—left his country and his reign ended, the relationship between King Saud and President Abdel Nasser remained strong, fraternal, and humane. The late Egyptian writer Jalal al‑Din al‑Hammamsi recounts in his well‑known book Dialogue Behind Walls the story of King Saud’s support for the Egyptian treasury, which was depleted five days after the June War. Despite the Western economic, military, and naval blockade on Egypt, King Saud sent an emissary to a certain location to bring back ten million dollars. He then handed the sum to President Gamal Abdel Nasser, saying: “Five million dollars are a gift from me to Egypt in support of its struggle, and five million dollars are a long‑term, interest‑free loan to my second homeland. And if Egypt were to need the lives of the sons of King Saud, he would not hesitate.”
Al‑Hammamsi recorded this, and one may refer to his book for details. It is worth noting that the total support pledged to Egypt by all donor states at the Khartoum Conference after the defeat amounted to only three times what King Saud alone—out of love for Egypt and its leader—had provided.
—Saif al‑Islam bin Saud