294. Deptels 298,2 3003 and 316.4 Hejaz Railway Survey Contract.5 I have given this matter closest attention since sending Embtel 273, December 216 but only last night received secret word from King Saud: “Tell the Ambassador he can be sure this contract will not be given to the Poles”.
On December 27 after receiving from Prince Faisal King’s message re Buraimi (Embtel 2827 ) I said reports that King had approved commission’s recommendation troubled me greatly; it seemed obvious Polish bid was Communist political move, and only last month King had told Ambassador Cooper “we will not permit one Communist in Saudi Arabia” (Delhi Embtel 1079 to Department8 ).
At first Faisal was evasive, arguing that commission, set up by three governments, had but abided by terms of reference and it was not for one government to question decisions. Why, he asked, do you not bid lower? I said we do not subsidize private enterprise and again asked if King had approved. He asked why was I troubled? I said because I feared reaction in Washington would be most unfavorable, and I was trying my best with His Majesty and with him to lay sound foundation for future Saudi–American relations.
After further [sic] to my unsatisfactory discussion, he admitted Commission’s recommendation had been “told to King who had raised no objection.” I urged reconsideration, stressing incongruity that Communists, recognized enemies of Islam, should be selected by Moslems even to survey reconstruction of their famous pilgrim railway leading to their sacred shrines. His reply was noncommittal but he seemed agree that Yusuf Yasin, who was present throughout and would shortly return Riyadh, should inform King of my views.
I had to be content with this but, … decided appeal to King. Fortunately Faisal left Jidda on hunting trip so I could not be accused of going behind his back.
Abdullah Balkhair, King’s private secretary, was arriving Jidda early following week…. He agreed write King … letter giving my views and sent it by trusted messenger.
Letter stressed unfavorable Washington reaction and suggested this [garble] even militant against Saudi interest in Buraimi dispute… .
King said he wished not only assure me Polish contract would not be approved but also send personal message to USG re Buraimi and other important matters. I will report these as soon as [name deleted] finishes writing up his notes.9
Re Polish contract King said that after phoning Abdullah he had sent personal letter to “our friend Shukri Quwatli” repeating arguments in Abdullah’s letter. … He said he had in fact not taken exception to Poles “working in desert under surveillance” but on reading those arguments he decided at once Poles must not have contract.
King closed subject by saying in substance, “this action is right but I want it to be taken also as new proof of my desire to continue to cooperate with the United States.” This was also major theme of message for USG… .
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1955–1957 VOLUME XIII, NEAR EAST: JORDAN-YEMEN, DOCUMENT 204