With the Israeli attack in Sinai on October 29 and the subsequent British-French assault on the Suez Canal, the focus of United States-Saudi Arabian relations shifted temporarily from the issues of Buraimi and the Dhahran Airfield to the new situation created by the Suez crisis. Although Saudi Arabia remained friendly and appreciative of United States policy on Suez, its relations with Britain and France rapidly deteriorated. On November 6, Saudi Arabia severed its diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom and France, and simultaneously forbade the loading and shipping of petroleum products to British and French ships and to any vessels destined for British or French ports. The Saudi Arabian Government also ordered Aramco to cut the flow of oil to Bahrain. With the closure of the Suez Canal, the United States grew increasingly concerned about the supply of Middle East oil to world markets, particularly to Europe. On November 8, at the 303d meeting of the National Security Council, President Eisenhower began the meeting by informing the Council that Robert Anderson, former Deputy Secretary of Defense, would deliver a report on the European oil situation in light of recent developments in the Middle East. After a lengthy review and discussion of the present oil situation, the dollar problem and a range of other matters pertaining to the supply of Middle East crude, the President raised the question of a total boycott of Arab oil. The memorandum of discussion includes the following exchange:
“The President pointed out that if we really get the Arabs sore at all of us, they could embargo all oil, which would ruin our present Middle East Emergency Committee plan which still counts on some 800,000 barrels of oil daily from Middle East sources. Mr. Anderson agreed, and said that furthermore, if the Arabs got sore enough, we could also lose what we are now getting from the Aramcotapline. Mr. Anderson thought it would not be amiss if the State Department talked to Ibn Saud and asked him to what countries he was willing that his oil be sent. After all, Saud is, in a certain sense, cutting off his nose to spite his face when he threatens to cut off oil presently going to Bahrein. The British and French get very little of their oil from Bahrein Island. Secretary Hoover commented that he had received another useful suggestion from Mr. Anderson, namely, that if our European friends come here to Washington in the next ten days, we should invite King Ibn Saud to visit us after their departure. The President expressed approval of this proposal, and pointed out philosophically that the way of the peacemaker is proverbially hard. For this reason he believed that the first thing to do is to try to avoid aggravating either side in the controversy any further. If all of this was an hour-by-hour proposition, the President believed we would be best advised to let our Middle East Emergency Committee study further action. With a smile, the President added that despite his stiff-necked Attorney General, he could give the industry members a certification that what they were planning and doing was in the interests of the national security. This might assist them with respect to any involvement with the anti-trust laws.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)
Additional documentation on Middle East oil is in Department of State, Central Files 886A.2553 and 880.2553.
On November 8, in a meeting attended by Hoover, Murphy, MacArthur, Rountree, and Phleger, the possibility of inviting Saud to the United States “within the next few weeks” was raised. (Memorandum of conversation by Earl Sohm, November 8; ibid., 033.84a11/11–856)
On November 9, in a conversation between Dulles and Adams, Adams noted that if Eden and Mollet came to the United States, it might be beneficial to invite Saud “as an offset.” Dulles noted that this suggestion had “merit.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation)
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1955–1957 VOLUME XIII, NEAR EAST: JORDAN-YEMEN, DOCUMENT 249